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Crossing the Threshold: Judicial Clarity on Permanence Orders and the Adoption and Children 
(Scotland) Act 2007 
 
 
Introduction 
Where a local authority wishes to seek a permanence order in respect of a child in its area, it must 
petition the court in terms of ss80-84 of the Adoption and Children (Scotland) Act 2007 (the “2007 
Act”).1  In a series of three cases from 2016 and 2017, the Supreme Court, Inner House, and Outer 
House have all given fundamental guidance on how these statutory provisions should be approached 
and applied: In the Matter of EV (A Child),2 KR v Stirling Council,3 and West Lothian Council, Petrs, re 
Children A & B.4  Rather than examining each case in turn, this note will consider the combined 
effect of this guidance, culminating in a suggested checklist for future permanence order petitions. 
 
Permanence Orders 
The primary impact of a permanence order is to vest in the local authority the responsibility of 
providing guidance to the child and the right to regulate the residence of the child.5  It is in effect a 
step short of adoption, since it transfers the responsibility for care of the child to the local authority, 
without severing the legal parental status of the child’s parents.6   It allows for greater stability for 
the child than being removed from their families without the transfer of parental responsibilities and 
rights.7  Permanence orders comprise a mandatory provision (regulating the child’s residence)8 and 
potentially a wide range of ancillary provisions,9 which can be tailored to reflect the needs of the 
child, including the right to specify contact between the child and any person the court considers 
appropriate.10   In any situation where it is proposed to interfere with the family life of parents and 
child, it is essential that this is done in accordance with law, in order to respect the article 8 rights of 
all parties.11  Failure to follow the statutory procedure, or cross a statutory threshold, will rightly 
                                                          
1 For a detailed account of the statutory provisions, see AB Wilkinson and KM Norrie, The Law Relating to 
Parent and Child in Scotland, ed KM Norrie (3rd ed, 2013), chapter 20 (hereafter “Norrie, Parent and Child”). 
2 [2017] UKSC 15 (hereafter “EV (A Child)”). 
3 [2016] CSIH 36. 
4 [2016] CSOH 50 (hereafter “West Lothian Council, A&B”). 
5 Section 81(2)(a) and (b) of the 2007 Act, with reference to the parental rights and responsibilities set out in 
ss1(1)(b)(ii) and 2(1)(a) of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 (hereafter the “1995 Act”).  
6 Section 80(2)(c) provides for a permanence order to be granted with authority to adopt. 
7 The rationale for permanence orders, and the many reasons for their introduction, is set out in Norrie, Parent 
and Child, paras 20-01-20-03. 
8 Section 81. 
9 Section 82. 
10 Section 82(1)(e). 
11 See In the matter of B (A Child) [2013] UKSC 33, para 29 per Lord Wilson and para 62 per Lord Neuberger. 
2 
 
render the final decision open to challenge – and, as these cases demonstrate, application of the 
legislation must be precise.   
 
The Golden Rule 
In the 2013 English case of In re J (Children) (Care Proceedings: Threshold Criteria),12 the Supreme 
Court provided clarity on how the English courts should determine care or supervision orders.  The 
English orders are governed by section 31 of the Children Act 1989.  The primary difference is the 
requirement in England to establish the likelihood of the child “suffering significant harm”, 
compared with the test for permanence orders under the 2007 Act in Scotland, which requires a 
finding that the child’s residence with a specific person will be, or be likely to be, “seriously 
detrimental” to the welfare of the child.13  The question then arose as to whether the guidance from 
the Supreme Court on the English test of “significant harm” also applied to the differently-worded 
test of “serious detriment” in Scottish cases.  It was on this sole point that leave to appeal to the 
Supreme Court was granted in EV (A Child).  In the appeal, however, it was accepted by all parties 
that In re J did apply: as Lord Reed noted, “The point which prompted the grant of permission to 
appeal does not, therefore, require to be decided.”14  Although not required to consider it, the UKSC 
nevertheless confirmed that their approach in In re J can apply to Scottish permanence cases, 
despite different legislation governing the issue.15  With the Inner House having granted leave to 
appeal, however, the Supreme Court was not restricted to that specific issue, and consequently 
proceeded to review the case as a whole.16  EV (A Child) is therefore valuable for (i) confirming the 
status of In re J in Scottish permanence order cases; and (ii) providing a meticulous analysis of the 
statutory requirements of the 2007 Act in respect of permanence orders. 
 
As regards the first point, when granting (or not) a permanence order, the court will typically be 
required to determine whether the child’s residence with a parent “is, or is likely to be, seriously 
detrimental to the welfare of the child”.17  In so doing, the court must make a prediction as to future 
outcomes.  In the words of Lady Hale from In re J, and cited by Lord Reed: 
Care courts are often told that the best predictor of the future is the past. But prediction is 
only possible where the past facts are proved. A real possibility that something has 
happened in the past is not enough to predict that it will happen in the future. It may be the 
                                                          
12 [2013] UKSC 9 (hereafter “In re J”). 
13 See EV (A Child), para 19. 
14 EV (A Child), para 3. 
15 EV (A Child), para 62.   
16 EV (A Child), para 2. 
17 Section 84(5)(c)(ii) of the 2007 Act, in Scotland.  The court must make this decision: Lord Reed emphasised 
that the court of first instance is not exercising a supervisory or review function in these cases, but is the 
primary decision maker: EV (A Child), para 18.  
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fact that a judge has found that there is a real possibility that something has happened. But 
that is not sufficient for this purpose. A finding of a real possibility that a child has suffered 
harm does not establish that he has. A finding of a real possibility that the harm which a 
child has suffered is ‘non-accidental’ does not establish that it was. A finding of a real 
possibility that this parent harmed a child does not establish that she did. Only a finding that 
he has, it was, or she did, as the case may be, can be sufficient to found a prediction that 
because it has happened in the past the same is likely to happen in the future. Care courts 
need to hear this message loud and clear.18 
 
This was formulated as a golden rule by Lord Hope also in In re J, and also approved by the Supreme 
Court in EV (A Child): “the golden rule must surely be that a prediction of future harm has to be 
based on facts that have been proved on a balance of probabilities”.19 
 
Thus, the first principle that can be derived from EV (A Child) is that the court of first instance must 
base its future predictions on a specific finding of fact as to past conduct, proved on the balance of 
probabilities, as expounded in In re J. 
 
Applying section 84 
The second point of note in EV (A Child) is the Supreme Court’s thorough and precise analysis of the 
statutory test in s84 of the 2007 Act.  Section 84(3)-(5) is in the following terms: 
 
(3)     The court may not make a permanence order in respect of a child unless it 
considers that it would be better for the child that the order be made than that it 
should not be made. 
(4)       In considering whether to make a permanence order and, if so, what 
provision the order should make, the court is to regard the need to safeguard and 
promote the welfare of the child throughout childhood as the paramount 
consideration. 
(5)       Before making a permanence order, the court must - 
(a)       after taking account of the child’s age and maturity, so far as is 
reasonably practicable - 
(i)        give the child the opportunity to indicate whether the child 
wishes to express any views, and 
(ii)       if the child does so wish, give the child the opportunity to 
express them, 
(b)       have regard to - 
(i)        any such views the child may express, 
(ii)       the child’s religious persuasion, racial origin and cultural and 
linguistic background, and 
(iii)     the likely effect on the child of the making of the order, and 
(c)       be satisfied that - 
                                                          
18 EV (A Child), para 22, citing Lady Hale in In re J, para 49. 
19 EV (A Child), para 23, citing Lord Hope in In re J, para 84. 
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(i)        there is no person who has the right mentioned in subsection 
(1)(a) of section 2 of the 1995 Act to have the child living with the 
person or otherwise to regulate the child’s residence, or 
(ii)       where there is such a person, the child’s residence with the 
person is, or is likely to be, seriously detrimental to the welfare of 
the child. 
 
In brief, these subsections impose a statutory duty on the court to consider the no order principle, 
the welfare principle, the views of the child, and a range of other factors, including any racial, 
cultural, or linguistic sensitivities.  As Lord Reed explained: 
These three subsections are of a different character from one another, and are to be applied 
in different ways. Section 84(5) is particularly complex. Subsections (a) and (b)(i) impose 
duties in respect of ascertaining and considering the views of the child, so far as is 
reasonably practicable. In the present case, given the very young age of the child, those 
duties did not arise. Subsection (b)(ii) and (iii) impose duties to have regard to specified 
factors. In the present case, two of the factors mentioned in subsection (b)(ii) are relevant, 
namely the child’s racial origin and cultural and linguistic background. 
 
Section 84(5)(c) is of a different nature. It lays down a factual test in each of subsections 
(c)(i) and (ii). One or other of those tests must be satisfied before a permanence order can 
be made. Section 84(5)(c) therefore imposes a threshold test. It has to be addressed, and 
satisfied, before any issue requires to be considered under the other provisions of section 
84.20 
 
Thus, the starting point for any judicial consideration of a permanence order petition is s84(5)(c).  
Yet the very fact that this critical threshold test is the final subsection of a lengthy statutory 
provision does not reflect its primacy, or direct the reader – or court – to consider it before all other 
statutory requirements.21  The likely consequence is that this test may be conflated with the 
preceding subsections, or overlooked altogether, rather than evaluated at the outset.22 Lord Reed 
cited, with approval, the concerns of the Inner House in the 2016 case of KR v Stirling Council: 
The threshold test [in s84(5)(c)] is in our opinion a matter of fundamental importance, and 
we must express regret at the manner in which section 84 of the Adoption and Children 
(Scotland) Act 2007 is structured.  In that section the fundamental threshold provision 
comes at the end, after the subsections dealing with the welfare of the child.  It would 
clearly be more sensible to state the threshold test at an earlier point, before the welfare 
provisions, because the threshold test must be satisfied before any of the other provisions 
becomes relevant.  As matters stand there is an obvious risk that the sheriff will fail to 
appreciate the fundamental importance of the criterion in subsection (5).  That is what 
appears to have happened in the present case. We were informed that subsection (5) was 
added to section 84 at a very late stage in the Parliamentary procedure, when it became 
apparent that no criterion for dispensing with parental consent had been specified.  If that is 
                                                          
20 EV (A Child) paras 10-13, emphasis added. 
21 The potential for going astray in applying this statutory test was addressed in detail at EV (A Child) para 31.  
22 The fact that the correct approach had already been laid out by the Inner House in TW v Aberdeenshire 
Council, [2012] CSIH 37, but courts were nevertheless continuing to err in their application of the statutory 
provisions, rather proves the point. 
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so, it clearly represents a serious error on the part of those responsible for determining the 
policy of the section and instructing Parliamentary counsel.  The result is a very poor piece of 
draughtsmanship.  For the future, any court in considering whether or not to impose a 
permanence order must have regard to the fact that the test in subsection (5) is a threshold 
test, and that it must be satisfied before the other provisions of section 84 become relevant.23 
 
Despite s84 requiring consideration of the welfare principle and the views of the child, these are 
actually matters to be considered after establishing that the threshold test in s84(5)(c) has been 
satisfied.  If s84(5)(c) cannot be satisfied, then the other elements of s84 do not come into play and 
there is nothing further to be done: the permanence order cannot be granted.   
 
The Threshold Test: s84(5)(c) 
The test in s84(5)(c) can be fulfilled in one of two ways, and both elements make reference to the 
parental rights granted in s2 of the 1995 Act.  These parental rights enable parents (or anyone who 
holds them) to exercise certain rights in respect of the child, and they are all framed in terms of the 
responsibilities imposed on the holder under s1 of the 1995 Act.  Thus, s1 requires a parent (or other 
person who has parental responsibilities) to safeguard and promote the child’s health, development 
and welfare; to provide direction and guidance, to maintain personal relations and direct contact 
with the child, and to act as the child’s legal representative.24 To this end, s2(1)(a) includes the right 
to have the child living with him or otherwise regulate the child’s residence.25  Under s84(5)(c)(i), 
where it is established that there is no person who has the right in s2(1)(a) of the 1995 Act to have 
the child living with him/her or otherwise to regulate the child’s residence, then the threshold test is 
fulfilled, and the other requirements of s84 may be addressed.  However, it is rare that there will be 
no such a person or persons – typically a parent26 – and so the court will normally have to turn to 
s84(5)(c)(ii).  Here, the threshold will only be crossed where the court finds it established that the 
child’s residence with such a person “is, or is likely to be, seriously detrimental to the welfare of the 
child.”27  It is in assessing this that the court may need to apply Lord Hope’s “golden rule”, in using 
past conduct established as a finding of fact, on the balance of probabilities, to determine the 
                                                          
23 KR v Stirling Council, para 15, emphasis added.  
24 Section 1(1)(a)-(d) of the 1995 Act, all qualified “in so far as compliance with this section is practicable 
and in the interests of the child.” 
25 The other rights granted in s2 are to enable the holder to fulfil the other responsibilities in s1. 
26 In this note, such a person will be referred to as the “parent” for simplicity, although of course it may not be 
the parent who holds the relevant parental right in s2(1)(a) of the 1995 Act. 
27 As Norrie observes, this should be read as extending to everyone who has the right to determine the child’s 
residence, not just any one person: Norrie, Parent and Child, para 20.14.  
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likelihood that the child’s residence with the parent will be seriously detrimental to the child’s 
welfare. 
 
Further Guidance on the s84(5)(c)(ii) Threshold Test 
Three points can be made about this threshold test. 
In the first place, as the Inner House noted in KR v Stirling Council when highlighting the erroneous 
approach of the sheriff, the test “does not require that the residence with the respondent is likely to 
be detrimental, but that it is likely to be seriously detrimental.”28  This higher standard must be met, 
and the judge at first instance should ideally be explicit that this is the test being applied. 
Secondly, conflating the different elements of s84 – welfare; child’s views; no order; serious 
detriment – will result in an incorrect approach to the statutory test.  Since s84(5)(c) is a factual test, 
these elements are not applicable to determine that fact: only where the fact of “serious detriment” 
has been established will the judge need to consider whether to grant the permanence order, with 
reference to the no order principle,29 the welfare of the child,30 and the views of the child.31  The 
Inner House was explicit about this in KR v Stirling Council: “It is only if the test is satisfied that the 
court requires to go on to consider the welfare of the child.”32  
The third element is that, in addressing s84(5)(c)(ii), the court may take into account not only the 
child’s future life with the parent(s), but also the current placement of the child.  Lord Reed 
highlighted this, with reference to the Lord Ordinary’s omission:  
… the Lord Ordinary did not support his conclusion by an analysis of the benefits and 
detriments of the available options. Although much was said about the local authority’s 
concerns about the father’s behaviour years earlier, nothing was said, for example, about 
how the child’s current foster care arrangements were working, or about the prospects of a 
suitable adoptive placement being found. There was no analysis of the merits of her living 
with a foster carer who has no intention of adopting her, as compared with her living with 
her parents. At the most basic level, the possibility of her parents’ being able to offer her a 
permanent home might have been a relevant factor, particularly if the prospects of her 
being adopted were poor, to set against the negative factors.33 
 
                                                          
28 KR v Stirling Council, para 19.  
29 Section 84(3). 
30 Section 84(4): as with ss11 and 16 of the 1995 Act, the welfare of the child is to be the paramount 
consideration at this stage. 
31 Section 84(5)(a) and (b). 
32 KR v Stirling Council, para 13, citing TW v Aberdeenshire Council, [2012] CSIH 37 at paras [12]-[13]. 
33 EV (A Child), para 53. 
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This holistic approach can be seen in practice in the 2016 Outer House decision in West Lothian 
Council, A & B. Lord Glennie concluded that the mother’s position alone did not risk serious 
detriment to the children’s welfare: 
I do not find it established that M’s parenting shortcomings alone would or should prevent 
the children being returned to her care.  There are shortcomings, plainly, but they could be 
substantially overcome with time and support...34   
 
However, held in balance against this was the fact that the children were happy and settled in their 
placements.  Quoting from Cumming-Bruce LJ in “less prosaic times”, the Lord Ordinary observed: 
“… you cannot dig up children in the way that you dig up geraniums: they form emotional roots and 
those roots have to be preserved intact.”35  The negative impact of moving children from their long-
established and successful placements was just as relevant when assessing the possibility of future 
serious detriment, and led the judge to conclude: 
In my opinion there is a serious though unquantifiable risk that any attempt to rehabilitate 
the children, or even one of them, to her care would end in failure.  That would cause 
enormous disruption to their lives at a very vulnerable time.  Their present placements, 
where they are settled in and very happy, might well not be available to them.  In those 
circumstances I am satisfied that returning the children to live with their mother is likely to 
be seriously detrimental to their welfare.36 
 
The whole circumstances of the child’s life are therefore relevant.37  The importance of considering 
the child’s placement also emphasises the crucial importance of acting promptly in trying to secure 
the return of children: in many cases, by the time the parent has addressed the problems which 
necessitated the children being taken into care in the first place, too much time will have passed, 
and the risk of damaging the new roots which have been established will outweigh the parent’s 
case.38   
 
Consent of the Child  
                                                          
34 West Lothian Council, A&B, paras 96-97.  
35 West Lothian Council, A&B, para 62, citing Cumming-Bruce LJ in In re L. (Child in Care: Access) [1985] F.L.R. 
95, 100, quoted with approval by Lord Oliver of Alymerton in In re KD (A Minor) (Ward: Termination of Access) 
[1988] 1 AC 806 at 829-830.  
36 West Lothian Council, A&B, para 104. 
37 In this context, Norrie notes that the court must focus on the child’s long-term welfare, rather than 
immediate welfare: Norrie, Parent and Child, para 20.15. 
38 See also, for example, Midlothian Council re Child S [2012] CSOH 63, paras 186-187 (upheld on appeal: 
[2013] CSIH 71).  
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While section 84(5)(c) provides us with a threshold test which must be satisfied first, there is in fact 
one prior step, albeit this may not be relevant in all cases.  Under s84(1), where a child is 12 years or 
older, and is capable of giving consent, then the permanence order may not be granted unless the 
child so consents.39  In the absence of such consent, the petition can go no further, and there will be 
no need to consider the threshold test.  If the child does consent, then the court may continue with 
the application of the threshold test, and then the remaining provisions in s84 – one of which 
includes taking the views of the child into consideration.  (And of course, the views of a child under 
12 may also be relevant, depending on the age and maturity of the child: but there is no need to 
obtain consent from a child under the age of 12.) 
 
Permanence Orders:  A Proposed Checklist 
Taking the key points from these three decisions – EV (A Child), KR v Stirling Council, and West 
Lothian Council, A&B – it is possible to construct a checklist for seeking (or contesting) a permanence 
order under ss80-84 of the 2007 Act.  This attempts to draw together the key elements of the 
statutory provisions and marshal them in the correct order for consideration, as outlined by the 
courts.  Critically, this order differs from the order in which they appear in the 2007 Act.  The 
proposed checklist is: 
1. Sections 84(1) and (2): Is the child aged 12 or over?  If so, has the child consented (s84(1)) or 
is the court satisfied that the child is incapable of giving consent (s84(2))?  If a child over 12 
is capable of giving consent and has not done so, there is no power to make the permanence 
order.  In all other cases, the court may proceed to Q.2. 
 
2. Section 84(5)(c) – the “threshold test”.  In terms of s84(5)(c)(i), is the court satisfied that 
“there is no person who has the right mentioned in subsection (1)(a) of section 2 of the 1995 
Act to have the child living with the person or otherwise to regulate the child’s residence”?  
If “yes” (ie there is no such person), then the threshold test has been satisfied and the court 
may proceed to Q.4.  If “no” the court must address Q.3. 
 
3. Section 84(5)(c)(ii) – where there is someone who has the statutory right to have the child 
living with them or to regulate the child’s residence, is the court satisfied that “the child’s 
residence with the person is, or is likely to be, seriously detrimental to the welfare of the 
                                                          
39 See for example West Lothian Council, A&B, para 56. 
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child”? If “yes” the court may proceed to Q. 4. 
 
To answer this question, the court may be guided by past conduct of the parties, but only 
where proved as fact, on the balance of probabilities, and not merely a possibility, as per 
Lord Hope’s “golden rule” in In re J.  Moreover, the court may also take into account not only 
the position of the parents or person seeking residence, but also the other options open for 
the child, including the advantages of the child’s current home. 
If the threshold test cannot be satisfied, the court may not make the permanence order. 
4. If the threshold test has been satisfied, the court must consider the other aspects of the 
statutory test before making the order.  This requires the court to address each of the 
following points: 
a. Section 80(3): establishing that each parental right and responsibility in respect of 
the child vests in a person;40  
b. Section 84(3): establishing that it is better for the Court to make the order than that 
it should not be made; 
c. Section 84(4): to have regard to the welfare of the child throughout childhood as the 
paramount consideration; 
d. Section 84(5)(a): taking account of the child’s age and maturity, so far as reasonably 
practicable give the child (a) the opportunity to indicate whether the child wishes to 
express any views and (b) if the child does wish to do so, give the child the 
opportunity to express them. Note that in terms of s84(6) a child aged 12 or over is 
presumed to be of sufficient age and maturity to express a view, but this does not 
imply that a child under 12 is not of sufficient age and maturity; 
e. Section 84(5)(b)(i): to have regard to any such views expressed by the child; 
f. Section 84(5)(b)(ii): to have regard to the child’s religious persuasion, racial origin 
and cultural and linguistic background;41 and 
g. Section 84(5)(b)(iii): to have regard to the likely effect on the child of the making of 
the order. 
 
Dr Gillian Black 
University of Edinburgh 
                                                          
40 See also EV (A Child), para 50.  
41 EV (A Child), paras 49 and 62. 
